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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion of fact (the ultimate fact) to which legal consequences attach. 21 State-
ments concerning to whom the defendant gave the keys to the car are evi-
dentiary leading up to the ultimate fact, that the defendant forbade O'Rourke's
presence in the car, to which legal consequences attach. In order to avoid in-
consistent and incongrous results, findings of ultimate fact must be conclusive
in a subsequent action.
It is possible that the Hinchey case represents an example of judicial
evasion of a difficult problem in the doctrine of collateral estoppel-namely,
what constitutes an ultimate or evidentiary fact. Definitions may be ex-
pounded, but their application to a specific fact situation is not automatic.
In the present case, the Appellate Division found the lack of permission by
the owner in regard to O'Rourke's presence in the car to be an "underlying
evidentiary question"; the Court of Appeals found the same fact to be "a
finding essential to judgment." Neither court, however, states any substantial
reasons in arriving at a conclusion nor attempts to clarify the difference be-
tween an evidentiary and ultimate fact.
WHo is AN AGGRIEVED PARTYr UNDER CIVIL PRACTICE ACT SECTION 557.
A patient's action for malpractice against a doctor and a private hospital,
in Baidach v. Togut,2 2 occasioned a consideration of the relationship between
Sections 557 and 211-a of the New York Civil Practice Act. The former con-
cerns the meaning of "aggrieved party" for appeal purposes while Section 211-a
grants the right to contribution among joint tort-feasors.
The plaintiff obtained a jury verdict and judgment against the doctor and
hospital owner, but the Appellate Division dismissed the claim against the
doctor and reduced the amount of the judgment.23 The hospital owner paid
the reduced judgment and attempted to appeal the dismissal of the doctor
claiming that since he lost the right of contribution against the doctor he was an
aggrieved party under Section 557(2) and thus qualified to appeal.24
The Court of Appeals held that the hospital owner was not a party ag-
grieved by the Appellate Division ruling because he has no right of contribution
against the doctor at the time he paid the judgment, and thus he had no right
to appeal.
There was no right of contribution at common law. An injured person
could sue any one of several joint tort-feasors and recover full damages, the
paying defendant having no recourse against the other tort-feasors. In deroga-
21. Morris, Law and Fact, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 1303, 1326 (1942). See also, The
Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1944).
22. 7 n.Y.2d 128, 196 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1959).
23. 8 A-D.2d 838, 190 N.YS.2d 120 (2d Dep't 1959) as amended 9 A.D.2d 628, 191
NS.Y.S.2d 365 (2d Dep't 1959).
24. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 557(2):
A person aggrieved who . . . has acquired since the making of the order or the
iendering of the judgment appealed from an interest which would have entitled
him to be so substituted if it had been previously acquired, may also appeal; ...
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tion of the common law, Section 211-a allows a right of contribution if two
conditions exist: (1) a joint money judgment against the tort-feasors, and (2)
the payment by one tort-feasor of more than his pro-rata share.25
The appellafit felt these two conditions were met in this case. The trial
court issued a joint judgment and the appellant paid the entire modified judg-
ment of the Appellate Division. This, the appellant felt, established a right to
appeal based on the holding of Epstein v. National Transportation Co.26 In
that case a joint judgment was rendered against two defendants. One defendant
paid the entire judgment and received a default judgment against the other
defendant for contribution. The non-paying defendant then appealed the
original judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant who had
paid was granted permission to be a respondent to this appeal in place of the
plaintiff, because he was a party aggrieved by the appeal within the meaning
of Section 557.
The respondent in the instant case argued that the hospital was not a party
aggrieved under Section 557 because no rights under Section 211-a ever arose.
There must be payment of a joint judgment by one defendant before the rights
under Section 211-a arise. Here the appellant paid when the only outstanding
judgment was one against him alone, the other defendant having been dismissed
by the Appellate Division. Although there once was a joint judgment, there
never was a payment of a joint judgment. As a result the right of contribution
never arose and there was no way in which the appellant was "aggrieved" by
the Appellate Division decision. Appellant, therefore, had no right to appeal.
The Epstein case is distinguishable. The defendant paid the entire judg-
ment in that case when the joint judgment was outstanding.
The majority accepted the respondent's contention in finding no right to
appeal. The dissent felt the hospital owner was a party aggrieved because the
potential right of contribution was lost by the Appellate Division determination.
The majority opinion demonstrates that in order for Section 211-a to
operate there must not only be a joint money judgment against two or more
tort-feasors and payment by one tort-feasor of more than his pro-rata share,
but the payment must be made while the joint judgment is outstanding. Any
further deviation from the practice at common law must be clearly stipulated
by the Legislature.
DIRECT ESTOPPEL OF WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
The Court of Appeals, in Peare v. Griggs r held a previous Virginia
property damage action was res judicata as to the present wrongful death action
litigated in the New York courts.
The controversy arose out of an automobile accident occurring in Virginia
25. Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 258 N.Y. 124, 179 N.E. 317 (1932).
26. 287 N.Y. 456, 40 N.E.2d 632 (1942).
27. 8 N.Y.2d 44, 201 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1960).
